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Abstract
We present an implementation of model checking for
the probabilistic pi-calculus, a process algebra which sup-
ports modelling of concurrency, mobility and discrete
probabilistic behaviour. Formal verification techniques
for this calculus have clear applications in several do-
mains, including mobile ad-hoc network protocols and
random security protocols. Despite this, no implementa-
tion of automated verification exists. Building upon the
(non-probabilistic) pi-calculus model checker MMC, we
first show an automated procedure for constructing the
Markov decision process representing a probabilistic pi-
calculus process. This can then be verified using existing
probabilistic model checkers such as PRISM. Secondly,
we demonstrate how for a large class of systems a more
efficient, compositional approach can be applied, which
uses our extension of MMC on each parallel component
of the system and then translates the results into a high-
level model description for the PRISM tool. The feasibil-
ity of our techniques is demonstrated through three case
studies from the pi-calculus literature.
1. Introduction
The pi-calculus [15] is a process algebra for modelling
concurrency and mobility. It is well suited to modelling,
for example, communication protocols for dynamic net-
work topologies and security protocols. For both classes
of systems, probability is often also a key ingredient.
Mobile ad-hoc network protocols, for example, can ex-
hibit stochastic behaviour both in terms of communi-
cation failures and random back-off procedures. Ran-
domised security protocols are used, for example, to
tackle anonymity or contract-signing [7]. The proba-
bilistic pi-calculus, which extends the original process
algebra with discrete probabilistic choice, has been pro-
posed as a formalism to model and reason about such
systems. The benefits for automatic formal verification
and tool support in this context are clear: reasoning
correctly about the behaviour of such models, particu-
larly interactions between probabilistic and nondeter-
ministic behaviour, is known to be non-trivial. Further-
more, the state spaces of probabilistic models of realis-
tic systems have a tendency to grow extremely quickly,
making manual verification difficult or infeasible.
In this paper, we describe an implementation of
probabilistic model checking for models described in
the simple probabilistic pi-calculus: an extension of the
pi-calculus which adds a discrete probabilistic choice
operator in addition to the existing nondeterministic
choice operator. This probabilistic choice is blind , in
the sense that each choice is followed immediately by a
silent τ action. This proves to be sufficiently expressive
for modelling the classes of system we are interested
in, whilst simplifying the semantics, and thus verifica-
tion, of the formalism.
Our approach is to adapt and reuse existing tools
for verification of mobile systems and of probabilistic
systems. We first developed an extension of the tool
MMC [24], a logic programming based model checker
for the pi-calculus. This extension, MMCsp, can derive
the semantic model for an arbitrary (input-closed) pro-
cess in the (finite-control) probabilistic pi-calculus. The
semantic model, which is given by a Markov decision
process (MDP), can then be analysed using standard
tools, such as the probabilistic model checker PRISM
[11]. For efficiency reasons, however, we take a com-
positional approach, applying MMCsp to each paral-
lel component of a system, processing the results to
produce a high-level description in the modelling lan-
guage of PRISM and then performing probabilistic ver-
ification. This avoids a potential blow-up in the size of
the intermediate MDP representation and allows us to
exploit the efficient symbolic model construction and
analysis techniques in PRISM. We present experimen-
tal results to illustrate the performance of our imple-
mentation on three pi-calculus case studies.
Related work. Various tools exist for automatic veri-
fication of the (non-probabilistic) pi-calculus. The Mo-
bility Workbench (MWB’99) [22] provides a bisimula-
tion checker and a pi-µ-calculus model checker. MMC
(Mobility Model Checker) [24], a more recently devel-
oped tool, also supports the pi-µ-calculus. The latter
places particular emphasis on efficiency. and is built
using logic programming technology. ProVerif [2] sup-
ports verification of the applied pi-calculus, a variant
of the basic calculus. It is aimed primarily at analy-
sis of cryptographic protocols and is theorem-prover
based. Two alternative approaches are the PIPER sys-
tem [4], which verifies pi-calculus processes augmented
with type signatures based on an extraction of sound
model using types and CCS processes, and [23, 21]
which translate a subset of the pi-calculus to the lan-
guage Promela for model checking in the SPIN tool.
A number of existing papers have proposed proba-
bilistic extensions of the pi-calculus. The first [10] ex-
tended the asynchronous version of the calculus, which
removes the output prefix construct, meaning processes
must terminate immediately after sending output. In
[5], a variant which is essentially the same as that used
in this paper was presented and probabilistic testing
equivalences were defined to reason about randomised
security protocols. In [1], the probabilistic pi-calculus
was used to formalise definitions of anonymity. To our
knowledge, this paper constitutes the first attempt to
implement automated verification in this area.
Also related are stochastic variants of the pi-calculus
[19] whose semantics are continuous-time Markov
chains. A number of associated discrete-event simu-
lators for this formalism are available, (e.g. SPIM,
BioSpi) but no model checking tools. Both the stochas-
tic pi-calculus and probabilistic model checking tech-
niques have been applied successfully to case studies in
the field of systems biology. It is hoped that the tech-
niques proposed in this paper will also prove to be
valuable in this domain.
Structure. The remainder of this paper is structured
as follows. Section 2 introduces and explains the prob-
abilistic pi-calculus and its semantics. Sections 3 and
4 describe our extension of MMC for evaluating these
semantics and how the result of this can be processed
into input for the PRISM tool. Section 5 presents ex-
perimental results and Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. The simple probabilistic pi-calculus
The pi-calculus is a process algebra for modelling con-
currency and mobility. Based on the process algebra
CCS, a key distinguishing feature of the calculus is
that it uses a single datatype, names, for both chan-
nels and variables, with the consequence that it is possi-
ble to communicate channel names between processes.
We use a probabilistic extension of the pi-calculus called
the simple probabilistic pi-calculus or pisp.
Syntax. We let N denote a countable set of names,
ranged over by x, xi, y, etc. Using P , Pi to range over
terms and α to denote an action, the syntax of the sim-
ple probabilistic pi-calculus is:
α ::= τ
∣
∣ x(y)
∣
∣ x¯y
P ::= 0
∣
∣ α.P
∣
∣ ∑
i∈I Pi
∣
∣ ∑
i∈I piτ.Pi
∣
∣
P | P
∣
∣ νxP
∣
∣ [x = y]P
∣
∣ A(y1, . . . , yn)
where I is an index set, pi ∈ (0, 1] with
∑
i∈I pi = 1
and A(x1, . . . , xn) , P is a process definition.
Intuitively, the operators of the calculus are de-
scribed as follows. The inactive process, denoted 0, can
perform no actions. The action-prefixed process α.P
can perform action α and then evolve into P , where
α is one of three types: x(y) inputs a name on x and
stores it in y, x¯y outputs the name y on x; and τ is the
silent action representing internal communication.
There are two types of choice: nondeterministic∑
i∈I Pi and probabilistic
∑
i∈I piτ.Pi. The former is
standard in the pi-calculus (and indeed CCS). The lat-
ter is the only new operator in this probabilistic exten-
sion of the pi-calculus. Notice that branches of the prob-
abilistic choice operator are always prefixed with τ ac-
tions, indicating that
∑
i∈I piτ.Pi randomly selects an
index i ∈ I with probability pi, performs a τ action and
then evolves as process Pi. This restricted form of prob-
abilistic choice is in practice sufficiently expressive but
simplifies semantics and analysis.
Parallel composition P1 | P2 means that processes
P1 and P2 can either proceed asynchronously or in-
teract though matching input/output actions. The re-
striction νxP , localises the scope of x in process P , i.e.
x can be considered a new and unique name within P .
The match construction [x = y]P can evolve to pro-
cess P only if the names x and y are identical. Finally,
A(y1, . . . , yn) is a recursively defined process with a def-
inition clause of the form A(x1, . . . , xn) , P .
An occurrence of name y in process P is bound if it
is in a subexpression of P of the form x(y) or νy; oth-
erwise, it is free. The sets of free and bound names
of process P are denoted by fn(P ) and bn(P ). A pro-
cess is closed if it does not contain any free names.
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A substitution σ is mapping from N to N . The sim-
plest substitutions are of the form {y/x} which map
x to y and all other names to themselves. We use the
notation Pσ to denote the term obtained from P by
substituting names according to σ. A substitution σ
satisfies the match [x = y], denoted σ |= [x = y] if
σ(x) = σ(y). Satisfaction extends to conjunctions of
matches in the obvious way.
In order to facilitate model checking of probabilistic
pi-calculus processes, we make a few simple assump-
tions. Firstly, we restrict our attention to the finite-
control version of the calculus, i.e. where recursion is
not permitted within parallel composition. This is nec-
essary to ensure that the resulting models are finite-
state. Secondly, we require that all bound names in
a process are distinct both from each other and from
any free names. Any process not satisfying this condi-
tion can easily be converted to an structurally congru-
ent one that does (through renaming of bound names).
Both of these restrictions are in fact also imposed by
the MMC pi-calculus model checker, on which our work
relies. Lastly, we require that pi-calculus processes are
input-closed , meaning that they require no inputs from
the environment.
Symbolic semantics. The operational semantics for
probabilistic extensions of the pi-calculus are typically
expressed in terms of MDPs or, equivalently, prob-
abilistic automata [20], which allow both probabilis-
tic and nondeterministic behaviour. In this paper, we
give a symbolic presentation of the operational seman-
tics. This approach is in fact quite common for the pi-
calculus and is particularly beneficial in the context of
automatic tool support, as is the case here, or for de-
velopment of bisimulation theories.
Consider the simple process a(x).x¯b which inputs a
name x on channel a and then uses x as a channel on
which to output the name b. A concrete approach to
the semantics can immediately establish the first step
of this process, i.e. that it inputs x on a. Subsequent be-
haviour, however, is dependent on the actual input to
x, and can only be determined once the process is com-
posed with another which sends output on a. A sym-
bolic approach allows the semantics of a process to in-
clude variables (e.g. x) which can be used in actions
(e.g. x¯b). This allows a compositional approach to be
adopted: given a parallel composition of several pro-
cesses, the semantics of each can be computed in full
separately, and then composed afterwards.
The symbolic semantics of the pisp calculus are ex-
pressed in terms of probabilistic symbolic transition
graphs (PSTGs). These are a simple probabilistic ex-
tension of the symbolic transition graphs of [9], previ-
ously used for the (non-probabilistic) pi-calculus [12, 3,
13, 14] and for CCS [9]. Alternative, they can be seen
as a symbolic extension of Markov decision processes.
Probabilistic symbolic transition graphs. Let N
be a countable set of names and P be a pisp process. The
probabilistic symbolic transition graph (PSTG) for P
is a tuple (S, sinit , T ) where:
• S is the set of symbolic states, each of which is a
term of the simple probabilistic pi-calculus;
• sinit ∈ S, the initial state, is the term P ;
• T ⊆ S ×Cond×Act ×Dist(S) is the set of prob-
abilistic symbolic transitions and is given by the
rules in Figure 1.
In the above,
• Cond denotes the set of all conditions onN , where
a condition is a finite conjunction of matches over
N (or true);
• Act is a set of actions of four basic types: τ , x(y),
x¯y and x¯(y), where x, y ∈ N .
• Dist(S) denotes the set of probability distributions
over the set S.
We use the notation Q
M,α
−−−→ {pi : Qi}i for the prob-
abilistic symbolic transition (Q,M,α, µ) ∈ T where
µ(R) =
∑
Qi=R
pi for any pisp term R. We abbrevi-
ate Q
M,α
−−−→ {1 : Q′} to Q
M,α
−−−→ Q′.
A symbolic state Q encodes a set of pisp terms. More
specifically, it encodes the set of terms derivable from
Q by substitutions applied to its input-bound names.
For example the symbolic state Q = a(x).x¯b represents
the terms Q{z/x} for any name z. Of the four action
types in Act the first three types are described in the
previous section. The fourth x¯(y) denotes output of a
bound name and is used by the rules Open and Close
to extend the scope of of the bound variable x.
A transition Q
M,α
−−−→ {pi : Qi}i represents the fact,
that under any substitution σ satisfyingM , the process
term Qσ can perform action α and then with probabil-
ity pi evolve as process Qiσ. Formally, we have the fol-
lowing Lemma which relates the symbolic (PSTG) and
concrete (MDP) semantics of pisp. This corresponds to
Lemma 2.4 in [13] for the (non-probabilistic) pi-calculus
and can be proved in similar fashion.
Lemma 1. Let P be a pisp term.
(a) If P
M,α
−−−→ {pi : Pi}i, then for any substitution σ
such that σ M with bn(α)∩ (fn(P )∪n(σ)) = ∅,
Pσ
ασ
−−→ {pi : Piσ}i.
(b) If Pσ
α
−→ {pi : Pi}i, then P
M,β
−−−→ {pi : P
′
i}i where
σ |= M , α = βσ and Pi = P
′
iσ.
3
Pre
α.P
α
−→ {1 : P}
Prob
(
∑
i piτ.Pi)
τ
−→ {pi : Pi}i
Sum
Pj
M,α
−−−→ {pjk : Pjk}jk
(∑
i∈I Pi
) M,α
−−−→ {pjk : Pjk}jk
j ∈ I
Par
P
M,α
−−−→ {pi : Pi}i
P | Q
M,α
−−−→ {pi : (Pi | Q)}i
bn(α) ∩ fn(Q) = ∅ Com
P
M,y(z)
−−−−→ {pi : Pi}i Q
N,x¯v
−−−→ {qj : Qj}j
P | Q
[x=y]∧M∧N,τ
−−−−−−−−−→ {pi·qj : Pi{v/z} | Qj}i,j
Res
P
M,α
−−−→ {pi : Pi}i
νxP
νxM,α
−−−−→ {pi : νxPi}i
x 6∈ n(α) Close
P
M,y(z)
−−−−→ {pi : Pi}i Q
N,x¯(v)
−−−−→ {qj : Qj}j
P | Q
[x=y]∧M∧N,τ
−−−−−−−−−→ {pi·qj : νv(Pi{v/z} | Qj)}i,j
Open
P
M,y¯x
−−−→ {pi : Pi}i
νxP
νxM,y¯(x)
−−−−−−→ {pi : Pi}i
x 6= y Match
P
M,α
−−−→ {pi : Pi}i
[x = y]P
[x=y]∧M,α
−−−−−−−→ {pi : Pi}i
{x, y} ∩ bn(α) = ∅
Ide
P{y1, . . . , yn/x1, . . . , xn}
M,α
−−−→ {pi : Pi}i
A(y1, . . . , yn)
M,α
−−−→ {pi : Pi}i
A(x1, . . . , xn) , P
νx true = true νx[x = x] = true
νx[x = y] = false νx[y = z] = [y = z]
νx(M ∧N) = νxM ∧ νxN
Figure 1. The symbolic semantics for pisp, including (inset) application of operator νx to conditions
3. Generating PSTGs using MMC
In this section we describe the automatic generation
of the probabilistic symbolic transition graph (PSTG)
for an arbitrary process expressed in the simple proba-
bilistic pi-calculus. This is achieved with an extension of
the (non-probabilistic) pi-calculus model checker MMC
[24], which from this point on we refer to as MMCsp.
MMCsp is based on only a subset of MMC’s func-
tionality: essentially the capability to construct the full
set of reachable states of a process. The restrictions
placed on the syntax of the calculus are the same that
we impose, as described in Section 2. MMC works by
(and derives its efficiency from) exploiting the simi-
larity between the way in which resolution-based logic
programming techniques handle variables and the way
in which the symbolic semantics of the pi-calculus han-
dle names [24]. It is implemented in the logic program-
ming system XSB, which is a dialect of Prolog.
With pi-calculus names represented by logic pro-
gramming (XSB) variables, the symbolic semantics of
the calculus can be directly encoded into XSB rules.
This has several benefits: firstly it gives a clear and
intuitive implementation; secondly, and more impor-
tantly, this encoding is provably correct [24].
Our implementation, MMCsp, is a direct extension
of this approach. We have a straightforward encoding
of the syntax of pisp into the language of XSB, with
pisp names and process identifiers represented by XSB
variables and constants, respectively. We then adapt
MMC’s predicate trans to represent the symbolic se-
mantics of pisp. Letting function fρ denote the one-to-
one mapping of pisp conditions, actions and processes
from XSB syntax to pisp syntax, then a tuple trans(P,
PSteps, M) in XSB, where PSteps is a list of com-
pound structures psteps(pi, act, Pi), represents the
symbolic probabilistic transition:
fρ(P)
fρ(M),fρ(act)
−−−−−−−−→ {pi : fρ(Pi)}i
The full definition of this encoding (the syntax of pisp
and the function fρ) are included in the Appendix.
Appendix 6. To relate this to the original version
of MMC, observe that a tuple trans(P, [psteps(1,
act, Q)], M) is equivalent to the definition trans(P,
act, M, Q) in [24].
Again adapting the approach of MMC, the defini-
tion of trans is a direct encoding of the symbolic se-
mantics of MMCsp and is shown in the Appendix. The
soundness and completeness of the encoding can be es-
tablished by induction on the length of derivations of
a query answer of trans and a symbolic transition in
pisp, respectively. The proof details are similar to The-
orem 2 and 3 in [24].
Finally, we add an extra XSB predicate stg(P),
which uses query-evaluation on trans to derive the
PSTG of process P and output it in a simple textual
format. This is effectively a depth-first traversal of the
PSTG and enumeration of all states and probabilis-
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def(toss(X),
pref(in(X, Y),
prob_choice([pref(tau(p), pref(out(Y, head), zero)),
pref(tau(1-p), pref(out(Y, tail), zero))]))).
| ?- stg(toss(try)).
#1: proc(toss(try))
*1: 1 ==
#2: prob_choice([pref(tau(p),pref(out(_h417,head),
zero)),pref(tau(1-p),pref(out(_h417,tail),zero))])
>1: _h417
’1: -- ’1’:in(try,_h417) --> 2
*2: 2 ==
#3: pref(out(_h417,head),zero)
’2: -- ’p’:tau --> 3
#4: pref(out(_h417,tail),zero)
’3: -- ’1 - p’:tau --> 4
*3: 3 ==
#5: zero
’4: -- ’1’:out(_h417,head) --> 5
*4: 4 ==
’5: -- ’1’:out(_h417,tail) --> 5
[1: try] [2: head] [3: tail]
+++ Statistics of toss(try) +++
Nodes: 5, Edges: 5, P-Steps: 4 Free Names: 3, Bound Names: 1
Figure 2. Sample output from MMCsp
tic symbolic transitions found. This is also included in
the Appendix. In Figure 2, we show the application of
MMCsp to the simple pisp process Toss:
Toss(x) , x(y).(pτ.y¯head.0 + (1− p)τ.y¯tail.0)
which receives a name y on channel x and then sends
out, on channel y, either head or tail, with probabil-
ity p or 1−p, respectively. In the output of the tool,
lines starting #i show the pisp term for the ith state,
lines starting *j and ’k enumerate transitions and the
individual edges of transitions, respectively. All bound
names are given unique names (e.g. h417) and dis-
played on lines beginning >. All free names used are
listed at the end of the PSTG.
4. Translating PSTGs into PRISM
The scheme described in the previous section can be
used to translate an arbitrary process described in
the simple probabilistic pi-calculus into its probabilis-
tic symbolic transition graph (PSTG). Since for an
input-closed pisp term its PSTG and concrete seman-
tics (MDP) coincide, one can directly map the PSTG
into PRISM to enable model checking of the pisp term.
For efficiency, however, we adopt where possible a com-
positional approach.
More specifically, in the case where systems are of
the form P = νx1 . . . νxk(P1| . . . |Pn) and each Pi con-
tains no instances of the ν operator, the basic idea is
compute the PSTG for each subprocess Pi, as described
in the previous section, map each PSTG to a PRISM
module, and then use PRISM to construct the seman-
tics of P through the parallel composition of these mod-
ules. At the level of PSTGs, our restricted form ensures
that there are no bounded output transitions x¯(y).
The overall process structure we impose (a parallel
composition of a set of processes, optionally enclosed
inside a restriction of one or more names) is actually
fairly typical: systems are generally modelled as a par-
allel composition of multiple components and, given
our focus on input-closed systems, it is likely that free
names used as channels between processes will be re-
stricted in this way. Furthermore, in most cases a pro-
cess can be rearranged to a structurally congruent pro-
cess which is of the correct form, by pushing ν opera-
tors to the outside. We have, for example, that P1|νxP2
and νx(P1|P2) are structurally congruent under the as-
sumption that x does not occur in P1. The only class
of processes which cannot be renamed in this way are
those which include ν inside recursion. In this case, the
process can in principle generate an infinite number of
new names. This can be resolved in the context of a
parallel composition with other processes, and there-
fore in such cases we can resort to the basic approach:
use MMCsp to construct the PSTG for the full sys-
tem and import this directly into PRISM.
There are two principal challenges regarding the
translation of a set of PSTGs into PRISM: (1) mapping
the name datatype into PRISM’s basic type system;
and (2) mapping binary (CCS-style) communication
of names over channels to PRISM’s multi-way (CSP-
style) synchronisation without value passing. In brief,
(1) is handled by enumerating the set of all free names
(which is known since the system is input-closed), as-
signing each an (identically named) integer constant to
represent it, and (2) is handled by introducing a syn-
chronous action label for each required combination of
process sender/receiver pair, channel and name. Com-
munication of names between processes is handled by
including in each process with bound input variable x,
an identically named local (integer) variable used to
represent a name.
Before discussing the details of this compositional
translation, we give both an overview of the PRISM
syntax and semantics and a simple example which il-
lustrates the key aspects of the translation.
PRISM semantics. A PRISM model comprises a set
of n modules, the state of each being given by a set
of finite-ranging local variables. The global state of the
model is determined by the union of all local variables,
which we denote V . The behaviour of each module is
defined by a set of guarded commands of the form:
[act ] guard → p1 : u1 + · · ·+ pm : um;
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where act is an (optional) action label, guard is a pred-
icate over V , pi ∈ (0, 1] and ui are updates of the form:
(x′1 = ui,1) & . . . & (x
′
k = ui,k)
where ui,j is a function over V . Intuitively, in global
state s of the PRISM model, a command in a module
is available if s |= guard . If a command is executed, the
module will, with probability pi update its local vari-
ables according to the update ui, by setting the value of
each local variable xj to ui,j(s). In practice (see for ex-
ample Figure 3), we omit probabilities equal to one and
update-components of the form (x′ = x).
The semantics of the whole PRISM model is the
parallel composition of all modules using the stan-
dard CSP parallel composition (i.e. modules synchro-
nise over all their common actions). The full semantics
of the PRISM language can be found at [18].
Example. Consider the following parallel composition
of two processes:
• Q , νa (Q1 | Q2)
• Q1 , νc νd
(
1
2τ.a¯c.c(v).0 +
1
2τ.a¯d.d(w).0
)
• Q2 , νb
(
a(x).b¯x.0
∣
∣ b(y).y¯e.0
)
Process Q1 includes two names c and d, available only
within the scope of Q1, representing private channels.
It makes a random choice, outputting with equal prob-
ability either the name c or d on channel a. It then at-
tempts to receive an input on the corresponding chan-
nel (c or d, respectively) and terminates. Process Q2
is the parallel composition of two subprocesses which
communicate over a channel b. The first subprocess in-
puts a name on channel a (which will be one of the two
private channels from Q1) and re-outputs it on chan-
nel b. The second subprocess inputs on channel b and
then outputs e on whichever channel it received.
Noting that c and d do not occur in Q2 and that b
does not occur in Q1, we can rewrite Q as the struc-
turally congruent process P , defined as follows:
• P , νa νb νc νd (P1 | P2 | P3)
• P1 ,
1
2τ.a¯c.c(v).0 +
1
2τ.a¯d.d(w).0
• P2 , a(x).b¯x.0
• P3 , b(y).y¯e.0
The corresponding PSTGs are:
• P1 : P1,1 τ •
1
2 //
1
2
  @
@@
@@
@@
@ P1,2 a¯c //P1,4
c(v) //P1,6
P1,3 a¯d //P1,5
d(w)
<<yyyyyyyy
• P2 : P2,1
a(x) //P2,2 b¯x //P2,3
• P3 : P3,1
b(y) //P3,2
y¯e //P3,3
1. const int a = 1; const int b = 2; const int c = 3;
2. const int d = 4; const int e = 5;
3. module P1
4. s1 : [1..6] init 1;
5. v : [0..5] init 0;
6. w : [0..5] init 0;
7. [] (s1 = 1) → 0.5 : (s
′
1
= 2) + 0.5 : (s′
1
= 3);
8. [a P1 P2 c] (s1 = 2) → (s
′
1
= 4);
9. [a P1 P2 d] (s1 = 3) → (s
′
1
= 5);
10. [c P3 P1 e] (s1 = 4) → (s
′
1
= 6); & (v ′ = e)
11. [d P3 P1 e] (s1 = 5) → (s
′
1
= 6); & (w ′ = e)
12. endmodule
13. module P2
14. s2 : [1..3] init 1
15. x : [0..5] init 0;
16. [a P1 P2 c] (s1 = 1) → (s
′
1
= 2) & (x ′ = c);
17. [a P1 P2 d] (s1 = 1) → (s
′
1
= 2) & (x ′ = d);
18. [b P2 P3 x ] (s1 = 2) → (s
′
1
= 3);
19. endmodule
20. module P3
21. s3 : [1..2] init 1
22. y : [0..5] init 0;
23. [b P2 P3 x ] (s3 = 1) → (s
′
3
= 2) & (y′ = x);
24. [c P3 P1 e] (s3 = 2) & (y = c) → (s
′
3
= 3);
25. [d P3 P1 e] (s3 = 2) & (y = d) → (s
′
3
= 3);
26. endmodule
Figure 3. PRISM code for the example
In the above we omit probabilities that are 1 and con-
ditions true. The PSTGs for P1, P2 and P3 have the
sets of bound names {v, w}, {x} and {y}, respectively,
and the total set of free names is {a, b, c, d, e}. The re-
sulting PRISM model is shown in Figure 3. This ex-
ample will be referred to in the full explanation of the
translation given below.
Formal translation. We assume that the set of all
names in the system is N , which is partitioned into
disjoint subsets: Nf , the set of all free names, and
Nb,1, . . . ,Nb,n, the sets of input-bound names for pro-
cesses P1, . . . , Pn.
For clarity, we will retain wherever possible identi-
cal notation between the pisp terms and the resulting
PRISM language description. Thus, each of the n sub-
processes (or PSTGs) Pi becomes a PRISM module Pi
and the (finite) set of pisp terms Si = {Qi,1, . . . , Qi,ki}
that constitute the states of the PSTG become a set
of integer indices Qi,1, Qi,2, . . . uniquely representing
each one.
Module Pi has |Nb,i| + 1 local variables: its local
state (i.e. state of corresponding PSTG) is represented
by variable si, with range 1, . . . , |Si|, and each bound
name xi,j ∈ Nb,i has a corresponding variable xi,j with
range 0, . . . , |Nf |. The model also includes Nf integer
constants, one for each free name in the system, which
are assigned (in some arbitrary order) distinct, con-
secutive non-zero values. If the value of variable xi,j
is equal to one of the these constants, then the corre-
sponding bound name has been assigned the appropri-
ate free name (by an input action). If xi,j=0, no input
to the bound name has occurred yet.
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In this way, the conditions which label transitions
of PSTGs can be translated directly into PRISM. For
example, let condition M be (x=a)∧(y=b) where x, y
are bound names and a, b free names. The translation
into PRISM is identical: (x=a)∧(y=b), where x, y are
integer variables and a, b integer constants.
For each symbolic probabilistic transition Qi
M,α
−−−→
{p1 : Ri,1, . . . , pm : Ri,m} in the PSTG for Pi, we will
include a set of corresponding PRISM commands in the
module Pi. We consider each type of transition sepa-
rately, beginning with the case where α = τ .
Case 1 (internal action). For a transition:
Qi
M,τ
−−−→ {p1 : Ri,1, . . . , pm : Ri,m}
we add the command:
[] (si=Qi) & M → p1 :(s
′
i=Qi,1) + · · ·+ pm :(s
′
i=Qi,m);
See Figure 3 line 7 for an example. This type of transi-
tion is in fact the only one which can actually include
multiple probabilistic choices. The remaining types of
transitions (input and output) are always of the form
Qi
M,α
−−−→ Ri (this fact can be derived easily from the se-
mantics in Figure 1).
Case 2 (output on free name). For a transition:
Qi
M,x¯y
−−−→ Ri where x ∈ Nf
we add, for each j ∈ {1, ..., n}\{i}, the command:
[x Pi Pj y] (si=Qi) & M → (s
′
i=Ri);
The channel x, sender Pi, receiver Pj and sent name y
are all encoded in the action label. See Figure 3 lines 8
and 18 for examples of sending free and bound names
y, respectively.
Case 3 (output on bound name). For a transition:
Qi
M,x¯y
−−−→ Ri where x ∈ Nb,i
we add, for each a ∈ Nf and j ∈ {1, ..., n}\{i}:
[a Pi Pj y] (si=Qi) & M & (x=a)→ (s
′
i=Ri);
This is similar to Case 2 except that we include a com-
mand for each possible value a of x. See for example
lines 24 and 25 of Figure 3.
Case 4 (input on free name). For a transition:
Qi
M,x(z)
−−−−→ Ri where x ∈ Nf
we add, for each y ∈ N\Nb,i and j ∈ {1, ..., n}\{i}:
[x Pi Pj y] (si=Qi) & M → (s
′
i=Ri) & (z
′=y);
For input actions, we add a line for each possible re-
ceived name y. The assignment (z′=y) models the up-
date of the bound name z to y. See for example lines
16 and 17 of Figure 3 which match the output com-
mands from lines 8 and 9.
Case 5 (input on bound name). For a transition:
Qi
M,x(z)
−−−−→ Ri where x ∈ Nb,i
we add, for a ∈ Nf , y ∈ N\Nb,i and j ∈ {1, ..., n}\{i}:
[a Pi Pj y] (si=Qi) & M & (x=a)→ (s
′
i=Ri) & (z
′=y);
Case 5 combines elements of Cases 3 and 4: we add a
command for each possible pairing of channel a that x
may represent and name y that may be received.
Finally, we need to remove some spurious commands
added in Cases 4 and 5, since they correspond to input
actions which will never occur. More precisely, for each
module Pj we identify action labels x Pi Pj y which
appear on a command in module Pj but which do not
appear in any of the commands in module Pi. Com-
mands with such action labels are removed from Pj .
Correctness of the translation. By assumption
the pisp term being translated is of the form P =
νx1 . . . νxk(P1| . . . |Pn). The first step in the proof is
to show that any term in the derivation tree of P is of
the form νx1 . . . νxk(Q1σ1 | · · · |Qnσn) where, for any
1≤j≤n, Qj is a state of the PSTG for the process Pj
and σj is a substitution from the bound names of Pj to
the free names of P . The proof is by induction of the
transition rules (concrete) and using Lemma 1.
We now show that the translation is correct by con-
structing an mapping between such pisp terms and the
states of the PRISM model and demonstrating that,
for any pisp term in the derivation tree of P , there is
a transition in the (concrete) semantics if and only if
the corresponding PRISM state has a transition. For
any pisp term νx1 . . . νxk(Q1σ1 | · · · |Qnσn) the state
in the PRISM model is constructed as follows: for any
1 ≤ j ≤ n, the values of the variables of module Pj are
given by sj = Qj , xj,1 = ij,1, . . . , xj,kj = ij,kj where if
σ(xj,l) = z ∈ Nf , then ij,l is the integer constant cor-
responding to the free variable z and otherwise (i.e.
σ(xj,l) = xj,l) ij,l equals 0.
Next consider any pisp term P
′ in the derivation tree
and transition:
Q = νx1 . . . νxk(Q1σ1 | · · · |Qnσn)
τ
−→ {pm : Rm}m.
From the transition rules and the conditions we have
imposed on the structure of pisp terms, there are the
following two cases to consider.
Silent actions. Qjσj
τ
−→ {pm : R
j
mσj}m, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, and
Rm = νx1 . . . νxk(Q1σ1 | . . . |R
j
mσj | . . . |Qnσn). From
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Lemma 1(b), we have Qj
Mj ,τ
−−−→ {pm : R
j
m} and σj |=
Mj , and hence by construction in the module Pj there
is a command of the form
[] (sj=Qj ) & Mj → p1 :(s
′
j=R
j
1) + · · ·+ pm :(s
′
j=R
j
m);
Finally, since σj |= Mj and by definition of the map-
ping between pisp terms and PRISM, it follows that the
PRISM state corresponding to Q satisfies the guard
(sj = Qj)&Mj and that the transition is preserved in
the translation.
Communication. Qjσj
x(z)
−−−→ Rjσj , Qlσl
x¯y
−→ Rlσl, 1 ≤
j 6= l ≤ n, a = τ and {pm : Rm}m = {1 : R} where R =
νx1 . . . νxk(Q1σ1 | . . . |Rjσj{y/z} | . . . |Rlσl | . . . |Qnσn).
Now, from Lemma 1(b) we have Qj
Mj ,x(z)
−−−−−→ Rj and
Ql
Ml,x¯y−−−−→ Rl, σj |= Mj and σl |= Ml. Consider-
ing the case when x is a free name (the case when x is
bound follows similarly), since y ∈ N\Nb,j in the mod-
ules Pj and Pl we have the commands
[x Pl Pj y] (sj=Qj ) & Mj → (s
′
j=Rj) & (z
′=y);
[x Pl Pj y] (sl=Ql) & Mk → (s
′
l=Rl);
respectively. Since σj |= Mj and σl |= Ml, it follows
that the guards (sj=Qj ) & Mj and (sl=Ql) & Mk hold
in the PRISM state encoding Q. Finally, since the en-
coding of Rjσj{y/z} can be obtained from the encod-
ing of Rjσj by setting the variable z to value y, it fol-
lows that that the transition is preserved by the trans-
lation.
To complete the proof it remains to show that any tran-
sition of the PRISM model is matched by a transition
in the corresponding pisp term. The result follows in a
similarly manner to the above using Lemma 1(a) in-
stead to Lemma 1(b).
Optimisations. The translation from PSTGs to
PRISM code described in this section can be op-
timised to reduce the size of the generated code
and the resulting model. The basic idea is to com-
pute an over-approximation of the possible val-
ues that each PSTG’s bound name can take and,
thus, the channels it can send out on and the val-
ues that can be sent on those channels. With this in-
formation, we can decrease the range of the PRISM lo-
cal variables corresponding to each bound name and
remove unnecessary commands corresponding to com-
binations of channel, value and processes that can
never occur. The over-approximation is computed it-
eratively, starting with an empty set of possible val-
ues for each bound name, and at each step adding
any name that can be received upon any chan-
nel that can be used to assign to the bound name. The
iterations required is bounded by the number of pro-
cesses n. For clarity of presentation, the example in
Figure 3 has been reduced in this way.
Properties. Simple probabilistic reachability proper-
ties, such as the maximum probability of failure or the
minimum probability of message delivery, can be en-
coded simply through the availability or absence of ac-
tions, as such properties are preserved in the trans-
lation to PRISM. For example, in the case of system
failure, one would modify the original pi-calculus de-
scription by adding to any pi-calculus process term rep-
resenting system failure the possibility to output on
a new distinct channel/action to allow one to iden-
tify the PRISM states representing system failure as
those states where this new action is available. Once
these states have been identified, one can construct a
PCTL formula which when verified will return either
the maximum or minimum probability of reaching this
set of states, that is calculate the maximum or mini-
mum of system failure. More general temporal proper-
ties, for example that a certain sequence of actions is
performed, could be encoded through the addition of a
test/watchdog process [8].
5. Implementation and results
Our implementation of model checking for the simple
probabilistic pi-calculus is fully automated and com-
prises three parts: (1) MMCsp, an extension of MMC
(as described in Section 3), which constructs the prob-
abilistic symbolic transition graphs (PSTGs) for one or
more pisp processes, (2) the translator from PSTGs to
PRISM code (as described in Section 4), implemented
in Java, and (3) the probabilistic model checker PRISM
[11] which builds the MDP from part (2) and performs
verification of PCTL properties. We based our imple-
mentation on MMC 1.0 and PRISM 3.1.
Firstly, we consider the dining cryptographers pro-
tocol (DCP) [6], Chaum’s randomised solution to the
classic anonymity problem in which a group of N par-
ties collectively establish whether either one of the
group or an independent party has to make a payment.
If the former, this is achieved without any of the N−1
non-paying parties knowing the identity of the paying
one. This was previously modelled in the probabilis-
tic pi-calculus in [1]. To check anonymity, we compute
the probability of reaching each of the possible out-
comes of the protocol (from the point of view of an in-
dividual party) and establish that they are identical.
Secondly, we study the partial secret exchange
(PSE) algorithm of [7] for anonymous contract sign-
ing between two parties. A probabilistic pi-calculus
model of PSE was given in [5]. The protocol was in-
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Model N States Transitions MTBDD Construction time (sec.) Model checking
nodes PSTGs PRISM MDP time (sec.)
5 160,543 592,397 58,641 10.9 0.81 0.77 2.49
6 1,475,401 6,520,558 100,290 13.1 0.91 1.43 7.82
DCP 7 13,221,889 68,121,834 154,500 15.2 1.17 2.62 21.3
8 116,192,457 683,937,352 221,170 18.1 1.21 4.72 55.2
9 1,005,495,499 6,657,256,911 463,425 19.1 1.37 19.3 732.9
3 9,321 32,052 37,008 4.86 0.75 1.60 1.89
PSE 4 89,025 419,172 103,779 6.60 0.91 3.95 4.47
5 837,361 5,028,700 173,644 8.12 1.20 8.47 11.5
3 9,328 32,059 37,251 5.29 0.75 2.38 2.16
PSE3 4 89,040 419,187 104,267 6.69 0.96 4.19 13.8
5 837,392 5,028,731 175,212 7.82 1.13 7.58 52.4
MCN 2 609 950 58,430 4.33 2.49 4.8 1.17
3 3,611 5,811 216,477 5.89 3.11 22.4 5.24
Table 1. Performance of probabilistic model checking pisp on three case studies
dependently analysed in PRISM [16], where a poten-
tial flaw of the protocol was identified, in that one
party always has an advantage over the other. Sev-
eral modifications to the protocol were proposed
and shown to have lower probability this occur-
ring. We used a pisp model of both the original and
modified versions to demonstrate the same flaw.
Thirdly, we constructed a pisp model of mo-
bile communication network (MCN), based on the
(non-probabilistic) pi-calculus model in [17]. The sys-
tem comprises N base stations with fixed communica-
tion links to a mobile switching centre and a mobile
station which can be connected to each of the base sta-
tions via radio links. The mobile station roams
between the base stations. When it changes base sta-
tion, the mobile communication network acts as an
intermediate party, controlling the handover pro-
tocol and exchange of communication links be-
tween stations. This case study was analysed using
MMC in [24]. In both this and the original pa-
per, though, the occurrence of a failure during the
handover protocol was modelled as a nondetermin-
istic choice. We are able to model this correctly, as
a random event. We check the maximum probabil-
ity of a handover operation completing successfully,
within a given number of communications.
Table 1 shows the performance of our implementa-
tion on the three case studies. Experiments were run
on a 2 GHz PC with 512 MB RAM running Linux.
For the DCP model, we vary the number of parties N ;
for the PSE model, we considered two variants (the
original protocol EGL and the modified version EGL3
from [16]) and varied the size of contract N . For the
MCN model, we vary the number of base stations N .
The table shows the size of the resulting MDPs (num-
ber of states/transitions) and corresponding storage in
PRISM (MTBDD nodes, where 1 node uses 20 bytes).
We also give the time required for each stage of the pro-
cess, i.e. constructing the PSTGs (using MMCsp), the
PRISM code (using the translator) and the MDP (us-
ing PRISM). Finally, we give the time to check a single
(quantitative) PCTL property for each using PRISM
(with the MTBDD engine).
The results are very encouraging. We see that our
techniques are scalable to the construction and anal-
ysis of pisp models with extremely large state spaces.
Furthermore the times required for all stages of the
process are relatively small. The MCN case study, al-
though smallest in terms of state space, is perhaps the
best example of the applicability of this implementa-
tion since it fully exploits the mobile aspects of the
calculus. The most obvious area for improvement in
our results concerns MTBDD sizes. This is largely due
to the fact the benefits of PRISM’s symbolic imple-
mentation are more difficult to exploit on automati-
cally generated PRISM code, such as is the case here.
We are confident that performance can be improved in
this area.
6. Conclusions
In this paper we have demonstrated the feasibility of
implementing model checking for the probabilistic pi-
calculus. The variant of the calculus (with blind prob-
abilistic choice) to which our techniques are applicable
has proved to be expressive enough for the appropriate
application domains (probabilistic algorithms for secu-
rity and dynamic communication protocols with fail-
ures and/or randomisation) and yet amenable to anal-
ysis with extensions and adaptions of existing verifica-
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tion tools. Furthermore we have shown, through its ap-
plication to several large examples, the efficiency of the
approach.
We would like to extend this work in several direc-
tions. For convenience of modelling, we plan to add
support for polyadic communication over channels. We
also hope to add support for more flexible property
specifications using watchdog processes and to extend
our approach to the stochastic pi-calculus. Finally, we
will investigate ways to further improve the efficiency
of our implementation, in particular, with regards to
the automatically generated PRISM code. Possibilities
include optimisations to reduce the resulting symbolic
(MTBDD) storage in PRISM and bisimulation minimi-
sation techniques.
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Appendix: Full description of MMCsp
This section gives a full definition of MMCsp, as out-
lined earlier in Section 3. MMCsp, which extends the
existing tool MMC [24], is an implementation in XSB
Prolog of the translation from a pisp process to the cor-
responding PSTG. Names in pisp are represented by
logic programming variables in XSB. Letting X, Y, Yi
range over variables, P over processes and
−→
P1,
−→
On over
comma-delimited lists of processes, the syntax of pisp
in the input language of MMCspis given by the follow-
ing BNF grammar:
act ::= tau | in(X, Y) | out(X, Y)
P ::= zero
| pref(act, P)
| choice(
−→
P )
| prob choice(
−−−−−−−−−−−→
pref(tau(p), P))
| par(P, P)
| nu(X, P)
| match((X = Y), P)
| proc(A¯(Y1, · · · , Yn))
where A¯ is the lower case form of process identifier A,
with the definition clause of the form
def(A¯(X1, · · · , Xn), P).
Assuming that ρ is a one-to-one function ρ map-
ping XSB variables to pisp names, the following func-
tion fρ relates the MMCsp representation of the
key components of pisp (conditions, actions and pro-
cesses) into their corresponding pisp notation:
Conditions:
fρ(true) = true
fρ(X = Y) = [ρ(X) = ρ(Y)]
fρ((M, N)) = fρ(M) ∧ fρ(N)
Actions:
fρ(tau) = τ
fρ(in(X, Y)) = ρ(X)(ρ(Y))
fρ(out(X, Y)) = ρ(X)ρ(Y)
fρ(out bound(X, Y)) = ρ(X)(ρ(Y))
Processes:
fρ(zero) = 0
fρ(pref(act, P)) = fρ(act).fρ(P)
fρ(choice(
−→
P )) =
nX
i=1
fρ(Pi)
fρ(prob choice(
−−−−−−−−−−−→
pref(tau(p), P))) =
nX
i=1
piτ.fρ(Pi)
fρ(par(P1, P2)) = fρ(P1)|fρ(P2)
fρ(nu(X, P)) = νρ(X)fρ(P)
fρ(match((X = Y), P)) = [ρ(X) = ρ(Y )]fρ(P)
fρ(proc(A¯(Y1, · · · , Yn))) = A(ρ(Y1), · · · , ρ(Yn))
where:
−→
P ≡ [P1, · · · , Pn]
−−−−−−−−−−−→
pref(tau(p), P) ≡ [pref(tau(p1), P1), · · · ,
pref(tau(pn), Pn)]
and A is defined with:
A(ρ(X1), · · · , ρ(Xn)) , fρ(P )
We can now define the XSB predicate trans, repre-
senting the symbolic semantics of pisp (Figure 1). A tu-
ple trans(P, PSteps, M), where PSteps is a list of
compound structures psteps(pi, act, Pi), represents
a symbolic probabilistic transition:
fρ(P)
fρ(M),fρ(act)
−−−−−−−−→ {pi : fρ(Pi)}i
The definition of trans is essentially a direct encod-
ing of the symbolic semantics and is shown in Fig-
ure 4. The predicates prob branch, set par steps
and set nu steps are defined to construct the list
PSteps according to the operational semantics rules
PROB, PAR and RES. Other auxiliary predicates
used in Figure 4 are given in Figure 5.
Finally, we give the XSB code for the predicate
stg(P), which applies query-evaluation of trans to
perform a depth-first traversal of the PSTG of process
P. The states and transitions of the PSTG are output
in text format. This is shown in Figure 6. The follow-
ing auxiliary predicates are used:
• ref(P, N) – associates process P with its sequen-
tial number N.
• set pedge num(K) – increases the counter for
probabilistic transitions.
• set edge num(K) – increases the counter for tran-
sition edges. Each branch in a probabilistic tran-
sition will will be counted as one transition edge.
• print match(M) – prints out condition M .
• next(PSteps, Nexts) – collects as a list Nexts all
the processes in probability distribution PSteps
and then calls rec go2 to invoke the depth-first
traversals for these processes one by one.
• clear – initialises some parameters, such as
state/edge counters and resets related tables.
• info(P) – prints out the statistic information of
process P.
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% PRE:
trans(pref(act, P), [pstep(1, act, P)], true).
% PROB:
trans(prob_choice(ProbBranches), PSteps, true) :-
prob_branch(ProbBranches, PSteps).
prob_branch([], []).
prob_branch([pref(tau(FirstProb), P)|Others],PSteps) :-
prob_branch(Others, OtherPSteps), append([pstep(FirstProb, tau, P)], OtherPSteps, PSteps).
% SUM:
trans(choice(Branches), PSteps, M) :-
length(Branches, Size), upto(Size, I), ith(I, Branches, Branch), trans(Branch, PSteps, M).
% PAR:
trans(par(P, Q), PSteps, M) :-
trans(P, PPSteps, M), set_par_psteps(PPSteps, Q, PSteps, 0).
trans(par(P, Q), PSteps, M) :-
trans(Q, QPSteps, M), set_par_psteps(QPSteps, P, PSteps, 1).
set_par_psteps([], _, [], _).
set_par_psteps([pstep(Prob, A, P)|Others], Q, PSteps, Which) :-
set_par_psteps(Others, Q, OtherPSteps, Which),
(Which == 0 -> append([pstep(Prob, A, par(P, Q)], OtherPSteps, PSteps)).
; append([pstep(Prob, A, par(Q, P)], OtherPSteps, PSteps))).
% RES:
trans(nu(Y, P), PSteps, M) :-
trans(P, PPSteps, M),
not_in_any(Y, PPSteps), not_in_constraint(Y, M),
set_nu_psteps(PPSteps, Y, PSteps).
set_nu_psteps([], _, []).
set_nu_psteps([pstep(Prob, A, P1)|Others], Y, PSteps) :-
set_nu_psteps(Others, Y, OtherPSteps),
append([pstep(Prob, A, nu(Y, P1))], OtherPSteps, PSteps).
% COM:
trans(par(P, Q), [pstep(1, tau, par(P1, Q1))], (M, N, L)) :-
trans(P, [pstep(1, A, P1)], M), trans(Q, [pstep(1, B, Q1)], N),
complement(A, B, L).
% OPEN:
trans(nu(Y, P), [pstep(1, outbound(X, Z), P1)], M) :-
trans(P, [pstep(1, out(X, Z), P1)], N, V),
Y == Z, Y \== X, not_in_constraint(Y, M).
% CLOSE:
trans(par(P, Q), [pstep(1, tau, nu(W, par(P1, Q1)))], (M, N, L)) :-
trans(P, [pstep(1, A, P1)], M), trans(Q, [pstep(1, B, Q1)], N),
comp_bound(A, B, W, L).
% MATCH:
trans(match((X=Y), P), PSteps, M) :- X == Y, trans(P, PSteps, M).
trans(match((X=Y), P), PSteps, (X=Y, M)) :- X \== Y, trans(P, PSteps, M).
% IDE:
trans(proc(PN), PSteps, M) :- def(PN, P), trans(P, PSteps, M).
Figure 4. XSB code for the trans predicate encoding the pisp symbolic semantics
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complement(out(X, W), in(Y, W), W, true) :- X == Y.
complement(out(X, W), in(Y, W), W, (X=Y)) :- X \== Y.
complement(in(X, W), out(Y, W), W, true) :- X == Y.
complement(in(X, W), out(Y, W), W, (X=Y)) :- X \== Y.
comp_bound(outbound(X, W), in(Y, W), W, true) :- X == Y.
comp_bound(outbound(X, W), in(Y, W), W, (X=Y)) :- X \== Y.
comp_bound(in(X, W), outbound(Y, W), W, true) :- X == Y.
comp_bound(in(X, W), outbound(Y, W), W, (X=Y)) :- X \== Y.
not_in_any(_, []).
not_in_any(Z, [pstep(_, A, _)|L]) :- not_in(Z, A), not_in_any(Z, L).
not_in(_, tau).
not_in(Z, in(X,Y)) :- Z \== X, Z \== Y.
not_in(Z, out(X,Y)) :- Z \== X, Z \== Y.
not_in(Z, outbound(X,Y)) :- Z \== X, Z \== Y.
not_in(Z, outbound1(X,Y)) :- Z \== X, Z \== Y.
not_in_constraint(_, true).
not_in_constraint(X, (Y=Z)) :- X \== Y, X \== Z.
not_in_constraint(X, (M, N)) :- not_in_constraint(X, M), not_in_constraint(X, N).
upto(N, N) :- N > 0.
upto(N, I) :- N > 0, N1 is N - 1, upto(N1, I).
Figure 5. Auxiliary XSB code for the trans predicate
:- table go2/1.
go2(Curr) :-
ref(Curr, N),
trans(Curr, PSteps, M),
set_pedge_num(K),
format("*~w: ~w == ", [K, N]),
print_matches(M),
next(PSteps, []),
fail.
rec_go2([]).
rec_go2([H|L]) :- go2(H); rec_go2(L).
next([], Nexts) :- rec_go2(Nexts).
next([pstep(Prob, A, Next)|Others], Nexts) :-
ref(Next, M), set_edge_num(K),
format("’~w: -- ’~w’:~w --> ~w~n", [K, Prob, A, M]),
append(Nexts, [Next], NewNexts),
next(Others, NewNexts).
stg(Proc) :-
clear,
go2(proc(Proc));
info(Proc).
Figure 6. XSB code for the stg predicate which outputs a PSTG using trans
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